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Abstract—The security of control systems under sensor attacks
is investigated. Redundant observability is introduced, explaining
existing security notions including the security index, attack
detectability, and observability under attacks. Equivalent con-
ditions between redundant observability and existing notions are
presented. Based on a bank of partial observers utilizing Kalman
decomposition and a decoder exploiting redundancy, an estimator
design algorithm is proposed enhancing the resilience of control
systems. This scheme substantially improves computational effi-
ciency utilizing far less memory.
Index Terms—Analytical redundancy, attack detection, attack
resilience, cyber-physical systems, resilient state estimation, se-
curity index.
Notation: The subset of natural numbers, {1, 2, · · · , p} ⊂ N,
is denoted by [p]. The cardinality of a set S is denoted
by |S| and the support of a vector y ∈ Cp is defined as
supp(y) := {i ∈ [p] : yi 6= 0} where yi is the i-th element of
y. The cardinality of supp(y) defines the `0 norm of a vector
y, i.e., ‖y‖0 := |supp(y)|. A vector y is said to be q-sparse if
‖y‖0 ≤ q. The set Σq := {y ∈ Cp : ‖y‖0 ≤ q} denotes the set
of all q-sparse vectors. The 2-norm of a vector y is defined as
‖y‖2 := √y∗y where y∗ is the Hermitian of y.
Assume that a vector y ∈ Cp and a subset Λ ⊂ [p] of
indices are given. We use the notation yΛ ∈ Cp to denote
that yΛ is obtained by setting the elements of y indexed by
Λc := [p] \ Λ = {i ∈ [p] : i /∈ Λ} to zero. Similar notation is
used for a matrix C ∈ Rp×n. The matrix obtained by setting
the rows of C indexed by Λc to zero, is denoted as CΛ ∈ Rp×n.
Sometimes the notation will be slightly modified to ypiΛ ∈ C|Λ|
(or CpiΛ ∈ R|Λ|×n), which denotes the vector y (or the matrix
C) whose elements (or rows) not corresponding to the index
set Λ are actually eliminated.
For a given index i ∈ [p], the index set Γni ⊂ [np] represents
{n(i− 1) + 1, n(i− 1) + 2, · · · , ni}. Similarly, for a given in-
dex set Λ ⊂ [p], the index set Λn ⊂ [np] denotes ⋃i∈Λ Γni .
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 14th European
Control Conference (ECC’15) as [1], where a theoretical derivation of resilient
state estimation for a continuous-time system was mainly discussed without
any concrete structure, detailed operation algorithm, or relationship with the
security index and attack detection.
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A vector z ∈ Cnp of length np can be split into p column
vectors of length n, i.e., z =
[
zn>1 z
n>
2 · · · zn>p
]> ∈ Cnp,
where zni ∈ Cn represents the i-th split column vector of
length n in z. Then we call z an n-stacked vector. With
the index set Γni defined above, it follows that z
n
i = z
pi
Γni
∈
Cn. The (n-stacked) support of z ∈ Cnp is defined as
suppn(z) := {i ∈ [p] : zni 6= 0n×1} and its cardinality defines
the (n-stacked) `0 norm of z, i.e., ‖z‖0n := |suppn(z)|.
Similarly to the usual vector case, an n-stacked vector z is
said to be (n-stacked) q-sparse when it holds that ‖z‖0n ≤ q,
and the set Σnq := {z ∈ Cnp : ‖z‖0n ≤ q} denotes the set of
all (n-stacked) q-sparse vectors.
For a matrix C ∈ Rp×n, the cospark of C is defined
as cospark(C) := min
x∈Rn, x6=0n×1
‖Cx‖0 and the (n-stacked)
cospark of a matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is similarly defined as
cosparkn(Φ) := min
x∈Rn, x6=0n×1
‖Φx‖0n . Subspaces R(C) and
N (C) denote the range space and the null space of C,
respectively. The induced matrix 2-norm of a matrix C is
defined as ‖C‖2 :=
√
λmax (C>C) = σmax(C) where
λmax(·) and σmax(·) denote the maximum eigenvalue and the
maximum singular value, respectively. In addition, σmin(·) is
used to denote the minimum singular value and C† is the
pseudoinverse of C. Finally, the set of normalized eigenvectors
of a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n is denoted as V(A) :=
{v ∈ Cn : Av = λv for some λ ∈ C, ‖v‖2 = 1} .
I. INTRODUCTION
The reliability of systems in various circumstances is one of
the main concerns for control engineers, and thus robust and
fault-tolerant control methods have been developed to cope
with model uncertainties, external disturbances, and failures
in system components. Recently, new threats or vulnerabilities
caused by malicious attacks have been reported as advances
in computers and communications increase the connectivity
and openness of systems [2]. Therefore, the resilience of
control systems to attack has become a critical system design
consideration [3]–[5] and the security problems of the system
whose measurements are compromised by adversaries have
been studied actively because sensors are one of the most
vulnerable points for the security of control systems [6]–[15].
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time linear time invari-
ant (LTI) system under sensor attacks written as
P :
{
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + d(k)
y¯(k) = y(k) + a(k) = Cx(k) + n(k) + a(k),
(1)
where x ∈ Rn denotes the state variables, u ∈ Rm denotes the
control inputs, y ∈ Rp denotes the attack-free sensor outputs,
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2Fig. 1: Configuration of the plant P and the state estimator E .
and y¯ ∈ Rp denotes the measurement data under attack signals.
The dynamics are disrupted by the process disturbance d ∈ Rn
and sensors are corrupted by the sensor attack a ∈ Rp as well
as the measurement noise n ∈ Rp. There is a total of p sensors
that measure the system outputs and the i-th measurement data
at time k is denoted by y¯i(k) = cix(k)+ni(k)+ai(k), where ci
is the i-th row of C. It is assumed that the disturbances/noises
are uniformly bounded, and the attacks can compromise up to
q out of p sensor outputs, as follows.
Assumption 1. The process disturbance d and each measure-
ment noise ni are uniformly bounded, i.e.,
‖d(k)‖2 ≤ dmax, ‖ni(k)‖2 ≤ nmax, ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [p]. ♦
Assumption 2. There exist at least p− q sensors that are not
attacked for all k ≥ 0, i.e.,∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ai(k) = 0, ∀k ≥ 0}∣∣ ≥ p− q. ♦
The primary objective of this paper is to design an estimator
E that detects the attacked sensors and estimates the state
x(k) of the given system P under Assumptions 1 and 2. To
this end, we first characterize the conditions under which the
attack can be detected and the state of P can be estimated
correctly. Then, we construct an attack-resilient estimator E
that is composed of p partial observers1 Oi and a decoder D
as shown in Fig. 1. In other words, the characterization of
observability with unknown signal a and construction of the
estimator are the two main topics of this paper.2
In the first part of this paper, a vulnerability analysis is
conducted. Fundamental limitations such as attack detectabil-
ity (and identifiability) conditions have been investigated in
[4] and the attack detectability is quantified by the security
index [7], which is the minimum number of attacks to remain
undetectable. This security index concept for a static output
map is generalized to a dynamical system under sensor attacks
in [8]. We have carefully explained the relationship between
1In this paper, the terms “observer” and “estimator” are used to indicate the
block of Oi and E in Fig. 1, respectively. That is, two terminologies should
be distinguished.
2From the control theoretic perspective, strong observability [16] and
unknown input observer (UIO)-based fault estimation [17] may be closely
related to the subject of interest here. If we consider the output equation
y¯(k) = Cx(k) + n(k) + IΛa(k) (instead of imposing Assumption 2 on a
in (1)) where I ∈ Rp×p is an identity matrix and Λ ⊂ [p] is any index set
satisfying |Λ| ≤ q, then, as mentioned in [11], the problem of interest is
strong observability for any q-sparse identity matrix IΛ, and the design of a
UIO-based estimator for unknown Λ.
these fundamental limitations and the redundant observability,
which is a kind of the analytical redundancy in measurements
and will be formally defined in Section III. Furthermore,
equivalent conditions between them are also presented.
In the second part of this paper, we propose a resilient and
robust state estimation scheme. Compared with the existing
resilient estimation algorithms in [9]–[15], the advantages
of our scheme are as follows. First, it does not require
any additional restrictive conditions other than the redundant
observability (compared with [9], [11], [13], [15]). Second,
an observer-based algorithm makes it possible to estimate
the current state, not the initial state or delay information
(compared with [9], [10], [12]). Third, the scheme is robust
in the sense that a bound on estimation error is explicitly
derived from system parameters (compared with [9]–[14]).
Finally, the scheme requires less computational effort and less
memory owing to the reduction in time and space complexity
(compared with [14]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the theoretical background of static error correcting
problems for a stacked vector case. We then present the rela-
tionship between redundant observability and security related
concepts such as dynamic security index, attack detectability,
and observability under attacks in Section III. In addition, par-
tial observers using the Kalman observability decomposition
are designed and the overall resilient and robust estimation
scheme is presented in Section IV. Finally, simulation results
with a three inertia system are given in Section V and we
provide concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. STATIC ERROR CORRECTION FOR STACKED VECTOR
In this section, a static error correcting algorithm is studied
that will play a key role for constructing the decoder D in the
estimator E . In particular, we solve a particular problem: given
a matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n, recover an unknown vector x ∈ Rn from
the known measurement zˆ given by3
zˆ = Φx+ v + e ∈ Rnp, (2)
where the n-stacked vector zˆ ∈ Rnp is corrupted by two
more unknown vectors v ∈ Rnp and e ∈ Rnp. The vector v
represents noise and is assumed to have bounded magnitude.
The vector e is called error, and it corresponds to an attack
signal whose magnitude can be arbitrarily large but is assumed
to be sparse. The matrix Φ is called a coding matrix.
A. Error Detectability and Detection Scheme
One should be able to detect the existence of an error to
reconstruct the original state vector x. Thus, we start this
subsection by introducing the notion of error detectability
when the measurement zˆ in (2) is noise-free (i.e., v = 0np×1).
Definition 1. A coding matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is said to be (n-
stacked) q-error detectable if, for all x, x′ ∈ Rn and e ∈ Σnq
such that Φx+ e = Φx′, it holds that x = x′.
3Later on, the analysis in Section III is performed based on the measurement
equation (11) and the design in Section IV is carried out based on the
estimation error equation (23). Note that both equations are in the form of
(2).
3Therefore, the matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is not (n-stacked) q-error
detectable if and only if there are two different x and x′ in
Rn, and e in Σnq such that Φx + e = Φx′. Now, two more
equivalent conditions that characterize the error detectability
of a coding matrix Φ are given.
Proposition 1. The following are equivalent:
(i) the matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is (n-stacked) q-error detectable;
(ii) for every set Λ ⊂ [p] satisfying |Λ| ≥ p − q, ΦΛn (or,
equivalently, ΦpiΛn ) has full column rank;
(iii) for any x ∈ Rn where x 6= 0n×1, ‖Φx‖0n > q.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose that (ii) does not hold, i.e., there
exists an index set Λ ⊂ [p] with |Λ| ≥ p − q and x 6= 0n×1
such that ΦΛnx = 0np×1. Then it follows that ‖e‖0n ≤ q where
e := −Φx. Thus, Φx + e = Φ0n×1, and Φ is not q-error
detectable.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists x 6= 0n×1 such that ‖Φx‖0n ≤ q. Let Λ be the
complement of suppn(Φx), i.e., Λ = (suppn(Φx))c. Then it is
obvious that |Λ| ≥ p− q and ΦΛnx = 0np×1. This contradicts
the full column rank condition of ΦΛn in (ii).
(iii) ⇒ (i): We again prove it by contradiction. Suppose that
Φ is not q-error detectable. That is, there exist x, x′ ∈ Rn
satisfying x 6= x′, and e ∈ Σnq such that Φx + e = Φx′. It
follows from x′−x 6= 0n×1 and e ∈ Σnq that ‖Φ(x′−x)‖0n =
‖e‖0n ≤ q. Thus, condition (iii) does not hold.
Remark 1. In Proposition 1, condition (ii) relates q-error de-
tectability to the left invertibility of Φ. That is, Φ remains left
invertible even if any (n-stacked) q row blocks are eliminated.
We may call this property q-redundant left invertibility. On
the other hand, condition (iii) establishes the link between the
error detectability and the cospark of a coding matrix. More
specifically, Φ is q-error detectable if and only if its cospark
is larger than q, i.e., cosparkn(Φ) > q. ♦
The equivalence conditions in Proposition 1 lead to a
criterion of q-sparse error detection based on a residual signal
r := zˆ − ΦΦ†zˆ = (Inp×np − Φ(Φ>Φ)−1Φ>) zˆ. (3)
Lemma 1. For the measurement zˆ = Φx+e where Φ ∈ Rnp×n
is (n-stacked) q-error detectable, x ∈ Rn, and e ∈ Σnq, let r =
zˆ−ΦΦ†zˆ. Then e = 0np×1 if and only if r = 0np×1. Moreover,
when e = 0np×1, the vector x is recovered by xˆ := Φ†zˆ.
Proof. Note that any non-zero q-sparse error e does not lie in
R(Φ) by Proposition 1.(iii). Hence, e 6= 0np×1 is equivalent
to the condition that zˆ = Φx + e /∈ R(Φ). Since ΦΦ† is a
projection matrix and it projects zˆ onto R(Φ), we have zˆ /∈
R(Φ) if and only if zˆ 6= ΦΦ†zˆ. This completes the proof.
Inspired by the error detection scheme for the noiseless case
of Lemma 1, let us now consider a scheme for the case when
the bounded noise v ∈ Rnp corrupts the measurements. For
this, let
ρp,q(Φ) := min {σmin (ΦΛn) : Λ ⊂ [p], |Λ| = p− q} ,
ηp,q(Φ) := max
{∥∥ΦΓni (ΦΛn)† ∥∥2 : i ∈ [p] \ Λ,
Λ ⊂ [p], |Λ| = p− q
}
,
κdp,q(Φ) := (
√
p + 1)
√
p− q/ρp,q(Φ),
κep,q(Φ) :=
(
ηp,q(Φ)
√
p− q + 1) (√p + 1).
Then, the following theorem says that one can “practically”
detect the q-sparse error in the noisy situation with the residual
r given in (3).
Theorem 1. For the measurement zˆ = Φx + v + e where
Φ ∈ Rnp×n is (n-stacked) q-error detectable, x ∈ Rn, e ∈ Σnq,
and v ∈ Rnp satisfying ‖vni ‖2 ≤ vmax, ∀i ∈ [p], let xˆ = Φ†zˆ
and r = zˆ − Φxˆ. Then:
(i) e 6= 0np×1 if
‖rni ‖2 = ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 >
√
p vmax for some i ∈ [p];
(ii) ‖eni ‖2 ≤ κep,q(Φ)vmax, ∀i ∈ [p], if
‖rni ‖2 = ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 ≤
√
p vmax for all i ∈ [p].
In the case of (ii), ‖xˆ− x‖2 ≤ κdp,q(Φ)vmax.
Proof. (i): This can be proved by contraposition. If e = 0np×1,
then we have, for all i ∈ [p],
‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 = ‖Φ
pi
Γni
x+ vni − ΦpiΓni (Φ
†(Φx+ v))‖2
= ‖vni − ΦpiΓni (Φ
†v)‖2 ≤ ‖(Inp×np − ΦΦ†)v‖2 ≤ √p vmax,
which follows from the fact that ‖Inp×np − ΦΦ†‖2 ≤ 1.
(ii): Let Λ be a subset of (suppn(e))c satisfying |Λ| = p −
q. Since
√
p vmax ≥ ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 for all i ∈ Λ from the
assumption, we have√
p(p− q) vmax ≥ ‖zˆΛn − ΦΛn xˆ‖2 = ‖ΦΛnx+ vΛn − ΦΛn xˆ‖2
= ‖ΦΛn(x− xˆ) + vΛn‖2 ≥ ‖ΦΛn(x− xˆ)‖2 − ‖vΛn‖2,
which leads to the result that
‖ΦΛn(x− xˆ)‖2 ≤ (√p + 1)
√
p− q vmax.
Therefore, it is obtained that
‖xˆ− x‖2 ≤ (√p + 1)
√
p− q vmax/ρp,q(Φ) = κdp,q(Φ)vmax.
Now, for any i ∈ Λc, it follows again from the assumption
that√
p vmax ≥ ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 = ‖Φ
pi
Γni
x+ vni + e
n
i − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2
= ‖ΦpiΓni (x− xˆ) + v
n
i + e
n
i ‖2
≥ −‖ΦpiΓni (x− xˆ)‖2 − vmax + ‖e
n
i ‖2.
Hence,
‖eni ‖2 ≤ ‖ΦpiΓni (x− xˆ)‖2 +
√
p vmax + vmax
= ‖ΦΓni Φ
†
ΛnΦΛn(x− xˆ)‖2 + (
√
p + 1)vmax
≤ ηp,q(Φ)(√p + 1)
√
p− q vmax + (√p + 1)vmax
= κep,q(Φ)vmax,
∀i ∈ Λc.
Since ‖eni ‖2 = 0 for all i ∈ Λ, this completes the proof.
In fact, when the magnitude of e is small, one cannot dif-
ferentiate between the noise v and the error e. Theorem 1.(ii)
4reflects this fact and guarantees that the estimation error is
small and xˆ approximately estimates x.
B. Error Correctability and Reconstruction Scheme
In the noiseless case, the following notion of error cor-
rectability is introduced and characterized in this subsection.
Definition 2. A coding matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is said to be (n-
stacked) q-error correctable if, for all x1, x2 ∈ Rn and e1, e2 ∈
Σnq such that Φx1 + e1 = Φx2 + e2, it holds that x1 = x2.
Now, one can easily obtain the following equivalence be-
tween the error correctability and the error detectability. The
following proposition implies that one can detect twice the
number of errors that can be corrected and reconstructed.
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent:
(i) the matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is (n-stacked) q-error correctable;
(ii) the matrix Φ ∈ Rnp×n is (n-stacked) 2q-error detectable.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Assume that x, x′ ∈ Rn and e ∈ Σn2q
satisfying Φx + e = Φx′ are given. Let e1 and e2 be
such that e = e1 − e2 where e1, e2 ∈ Σnq. Thus, we have
Φx+ e1 = Φx
′ + e2. Since Φ ∈ Rnp×n is q-error correctable,
it follows that x = x′.
(ii)⇒ (i): Assume that x1, x2 ∈ Rn and e1, e2 ∈ Σnq satisfying
Φx1+e1 = Φx2+e2 are given. Then, we have Φx1+e = Φx2
where e = e1 − e2 ∈ Σn2q. Since Φ ∈ Rnp×n is 2q-error
detectable, it follows that x1 = x2.
Based on the notion of q-error correctability, we discuss the
problem of constructing a decoder that can actually correct (n-
stacked) q errors and recover the original state x when v =
0np×1 in (2). That is, we find a map D : Rnp → Rn such
that D(zˆ) = x where zˆ = Φx + e ∈ Rnp and e ∈ Σnq. This
is basically achieved through `0 minimization [18, Section 3].
Here we claim that searching over a finite set is enough to
solve the minimization problem.
Theorem 2. For the measurement zˆ = Φx+ e ∈ Rnp with (n-
stacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ Rnp×n, x ∈ Rn, and e ∈ Σnq,
it follows that
x = arg min
χ∈Fp,r(zˆ)
‖zˆ − Φχ‖0n
= arg min
χ∈Fp,r(zˆ)
∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni χ‖2 > 0}∣∣,
(4)
(4′)
where
Fp,r(zˆ) :=
{
(ΦΛn)
†
zˆΛn ∈ Rn : Λ ⊂ [p], |Λ| = p− r
}
and r is any integer satisfying q ≤ r ≤ 2q.
Proof. We first show that the vector x belongs to Fp,r(zˆ).
Pick any subset Λ ⊂ (suppn(e))c satisfying |Λ| = p − r.
Because ΦΛn has full column rank by Propositions 1.(ii) and
2, it follows that χ = (ΦΛn)
†
zˆΛn = (ΦΛn)
†
ΦΛnx = x. Hence,
x ∈ Fp,r(zˆ). Now, it suffices to show that x is a minimizer of
‖zˆ−Φχ‖0n . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists x′ 6= x in Fp,r(zˆ) that minimizes ‖zˆ − Φχ‖0n , then,
with e′ := zˆ −Φx′, we have that zˆ = Φx′ + e′ = Φx+ e and
‖e′‖0n ≤ ‖e‖0n ≤ q because e′ is a minimal solution. This
contradicts the assumption that Φ is q-error correctable.
This theorem claims that it is enough to search over the
finite set Fp,r(zˆ), not the whole space Rn, to solve (4). Keeping
in mind the fact that |Fp,r(zˆ)| ≤
(
p
p−r
)
=
(
p
r
)
, one can choose
any integer r between q and 2q to minimize
(
p
r
)
.
Remark 2. The `0 minimization problem over Rn is shown to
be NP-hard [19]. Whereas previous research efforts have been
devoted to a relaxation of the problem by imposing some addi-
tional conditions (e.g., [9], [11]), Theorem 2 actually relieves
the computational complexity by reducing the search space to
a finite set. It is a kind of combinatorial approach that tests only(
p
r
) ≤ pr (or ( pp−r) ≤ pp−r) candidates with the freedom of
selecting r between q and 2q, whereas naive brute-force search
algorithm without any information on error correctability has
no choice but to test all
(
p
1
)
+
(
p
2
)
+· · ·+(pp) ≈ 2p combinations.
In our case, the computational efforts decrease drastically by
selecting r = q when q  p (or selecting r = 2q when
q ≈ p/2) for example. Compared with other combinatorial
algorithms in [1], [4], [12], Theorem 2 is more relaxed by
introducing r that can vary between q and 2q. ♦
Finally, the following lemma presents a simple criterion
to verify whether a given vector xˆ ∈ Rn coincides with the
original input x.
Lemma 2. For the measurement zˆ = Φx+ e ∈ Rnp with (n-
stacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ Rnp×n, x ∈ Rn, and e ∈ Σnq,
‖zˆ − Φxˆ‖0n ≤ q if and only if x = xˆ.
Proof. (if): This is trivial because ‖zˆ − Φxˆ‖0n = ‖e‖0n ≤ q.
(only if): Define eˆ := zˆ − Φxˆ, then zˆ = Φxˆ + eˆ = Φx + e
where e, eˆ ∈ Σnq. Since Φ is q-error correctable, it follows
from Definition 2 that x = xˆ.
Now, bounded noise v ∈ Rnp satisfying ‖vni ‖2 ≤ vmax for
all i ∈ [p] is taken into account and a state recovery scheme
estimating x is presented. More precisely, we show that any
solution (χ∗, ε∗) to the following relaxed `0 minimization
problem yields an approximation of x as xˆ = χ∗:
min
χ∈Fp,r(zˆ), ε∈Rnp
‖ε‖0n
subject to ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni χ− ε
n
i ‖2 ≤ v′max, ∀i ∈ [p],
(5)
where r is any integer satisfying q ≤ r ≤ 2q and
v′max := ϑp,q,r(Φ)vmax
:= max
{
η′p,q,r(Φ)
√
p− r + 1,√p− r} vmax,
η′p,q,r(Φ) := max
Λ⊂[p]
|Λ|=p−q
min
Λ¯⊂Λ
|Λ¯|=p−r
max
i∈Λ\Λ¯
∥∥ΦΓni (ΦΛ¯n)† ∥∥2.
The above optimization problem is not easily implementable
because the variable ε is searched over Rnp under constraints.
Hence, we present another optimization problem, which may
be considered as a relaxation of (4′):
xˆ = arg min
χ∈Fp,r(zˆ)
∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni χ‖2 > v′max}∣∣. (5′)
Whereas the problem (5) or (5′) need not have a unique
solution, the following theorem shows equivalence between
(5) and (5′), and presents an upper bound of ‖xˆ−x‖2 for any
solution xˆ of (5) or (5′).
5Theorem 3. For the measurement zˆ = Φx+e+v ∈ Rnp with
(n-stacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ Rnp×n, x ∈ Rn, e ∈ Σnq,
and v ∈ Rnp such that ‖vni ‖2 ≤ vmax, ∀i ∈ [p], the following
hold:
(i) two optimization problems (5) and (5′) are equivalent (that
is, a solution xˆ to (5) is also a solution to (5′) and vice versa);
(ii) for any solution xˆ, ‖xˆ− x‖2 ≤ κcp,q,r(Φ) vmax where
κcp,q,r(Φ) := (ϑp,q,r(Φ) + 1)
√
p− 2q/ρp,2q(Φ).
Proof. (i): Let xˆ = χ∗ and eˆ = ε∗ be any solution to (5), and
let vˆ := zˆ − Φxˆ − eˆ. Then, for any i ∈ [p], it automatically
holds that ‖vˆni ‖2 ≤ v′max by the constraint in (5). Similarly,
let xˆ′ be the solution to (5′). Define eˆ′nj := zˆ
n
j − ΦpiΓnj xˆ
′ and
vˆ′nj := 0n×1 for j ∈
{
i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ
′‖2 > v′max
}
, and
define eˆ′nj := 0n×1 and vˆ
′n
j := zˆ
n
j − ΦpiΓnj xˆ
′ for j ∈ {i ∈ [p] :
‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ
′‖2 ≤ v′max
}
. Then, (χ, ε) = (xˆ′, eˆ′) satisfies the
constraint in (5).
We claim that xˆ with eˆ, the solution of (5), is also a
solution of (5′) and vice versa. Indeed, directly from the above
definition of eˆ′, it is obtained that∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ′‖2 > v′max}∣∣ = ‖eˆ′‖0n . (6)
On the other hand, because ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ − eˆ
n
i ‖2 ≤ v′max for
all i ∈ [p], it follows that ‖zˆnj − ΦpiΓnj xˆ‖2 ≤ v
′
max for any
j ∈ (suppn(eˆ))c. Thus, we have∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣ ≤ ‖eˆ‖0n . (7)
Since eˆ is the minimal solution of (5), it holds that
‖eˆ‖0n ≤ ‖eˆ′‖0n . (8)
Finally, because xˆ′ is the solution of (5′), it follows that∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ′‖2 > v′max}∣∣
≤ ∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣. (9)
Combining (6), (7), (8), and (9) together results in
‖eˆ‖0n =
∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣
= ‖eˆ′‖0n =
∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ′‖2 > v′max}∣∣.
Consequently, xˆ is a solution of (5′) and xˆ′ is a solution of
(5). This concludes the claim.
(ii): Let (xˆ, eˆ) be a solution (χ∗, ε∗) of (5). Then, we first show
that ‖eˆ‖0n ≤ q. Let Λ be a subset of (suppn(e))c satisfying
|Λ| = p − q. Then, there always exists a subset Λ¯ ⊂ Λ such
that |Λ¯| = p − r and max
i∈Λ\Λ¯
∥∥ΦΓni (ΦΛ¯n)† ∥∥2 ≤ η′p,q,r(Φ). Let
x¯ := (ΦΛ¯n)
†
zˆΛ¯n , which belongs to Fp,r(zˆ). Then it follows
that x¯ = x + (ΦΛ¯n)
†
vΛ¯n because ΦΛ¯n has full column rank,
and thus (ΦΛ¯n)
†
ΦΛ¯n = In×n. With x¯ at hand, let us define
a noise vector v¯ := zˆΛn − ΦΛn x¯ ∈ Rnp and an error vector
e¯ := zˆ − Φx¯− v¯. Here, the vector v¯ can be decomposed as
v¯ = ΦΛnx+ vΛn − ΦΛn(x+ (ΦΛ¯n)† vΛ¯n)
= v(Λ\Λ¯)n + vΛ¯n − (Φ(Λ\Λ¯)n + ΦΛ¯n) (ΦΛ¯n)† vΛ¯n
= v(Λ\Λ¯)n − Φ(Λ\Λ¯)n (ΦΛ¯n)† vΛ¯n + (Inp×np− ΦΛ¯n(ΦΛ¯n)†)vΛ¯n ,
and thus it follows that
‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni x¯− e¯
n
i ‖2 = ‖v¯ni ‖2
≤ max{η′p,q,r(Φ)√p− r + 1,√p− r} vmax = v′max, ∀i ∈ [p],
in which, we use the fact that ‖Inp×np − ΦΛ¯n(ΦΛ¯n)†‖2 ≤ 1
and ‖vΛ¯n‖2 ≤
√
p− r vmax. Therefore, it is clear that x¯ and e¯
satisfy the constraint in (5), i.e., ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni x¯ − e¯
n
i ‖2 ≤ v′max
for all i ∈ [p]. Moreover, from the construction, ‖e¯‖0n ≤ q.
Finally, noting that eˆ is the minimal solution of (5), we have
that ‖eˆ‖0n ≤ ‖e¯‖0n ≤ q.
Now, the solution (xˆ, eˆ) of (5) yields the corresponding
noise vector vˆ as vˆ := zˆ−Φxˆ−eˆ, which satisfies ‖vˆni ‖2 ≤ v′max
for all i ∈ [p] by the constraint of (5). Therefore, we have two
expressions for the measurement zˆ = Φx+v+e = Φxˆ+ vˆ+ eˆ,
and we are interested in the difference x˜ := xˆ − x. Let
e˜ := eˆ − e and v˜ := vˆ − v. Then, ‖e˜‖0n ≤ 2q and
‖v˜ni ‖2 ≤ v′max + vmax = (ϑp,q,r(Φ) + 1) vmax for all i ∈ [p].
Let Λ˜ be any subset of (suppn(e˜))c such that |Λ˜| = p − 2q.
Then, it follows from Φx˜+ e˜ = −v˜ that ΦΛ˜n x˜ = −v˜Λ˜n . Since
ΦΛ˜n has full column rank by Proposition 2.(ii), it follows
that x˜ = − (ΦΛ˜n)† v˜Λ˜n . Therefore, one can compute the
bound of ‖x˜‖2 as ‖x˜‖2 ≤
∥∥ (ΦΛ˜n)† ∥∥2‖v˜Λ˜n‖2 ≤ (ϑp,q,r(Φ) +
1)
√
p− 2q vmax/ρp,2q(Φ) = κcp,q,r(Φ)vmax.
As in Lemma 2, a simple criterion to check whether a
given vector xˆ ∈ Rn is close to the original x with noisy
measurements, is also derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For the measurement zˆ = Φx+e+v ∈ Rnp with
(n-stacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ Rnp×n, x ∈ Rn, e ∈ Σnq,
and v ∈ Rnp such that ‖vni ‖2 ≤ vmax, ∀i ∈ [p], the following
hold:
(i) ‖xˆ− x‖2 ≤ κcp,q,r(Φ) vmax if xˆ satisfies∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣ ≤ q;
(ii) ‖xˆ− x‖2 > κc′p,q,r(Φ) vmax if xˆ satisfies∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣ > q,
where κc
′
p,q,r(Φ) := (ϑp,q,r(Φ)− 1)/max
i∈[p]
‖ΦΓni ‖2.
Proof. (i): With a given xˆ, construct the error vector eˆ and the
noise vector vˆ as follows. For j ∈ {i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 >
v′max
}
, define eˆnj := zˆ
n
j − ΦpiΓnj xˆ and vˆ
n
j := 0n×1. For j ∈
{
i ∈
[p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 ≤ v
′
max
}
, define eˆnj := 0n×1 and vˆ
n
j :=
zˆnj −ΦpiΓnj xˆ. Then, we have two expressions for the measurement
zˆ = Φx+ v+ e = Φxˆ+ vˆ+ eˆ, in which ‖vˆni ‖2 ≤ v′max for all
i ∈ [p] and ‖eˆ‖0n ≤ q. Therefore, the same argument in the
proof of Theorem 3.(ii) applies and concludes the claim.
(ii): This can be shown by contradiction. Let ‖xˆ − x‖2 ≤
κc
′
p,q,r(Φ) vmax. Then, for i ∈ (suppn(e))c,
‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 = ‖Φ
pi
Γni
(x− xˆ) + vni ‖2
≤
(
max
i∈[p]
‖ΦΓni ‖2
)
κc
′
p,q,r(Φ)vmax + vmax
= ϑp,q,r(Φ)vmax = v
′
max.
Therefore, we have
∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆni − ΦpiΓni xˆ‖2 > v′max}∣∣ ≤ q
because ‖e‖0n ≤ q.
6III. CHARACTERIZATION OF REDUNDANT OBSERVABILITY
In this section, we introduce the redundant observability
and relate that concept to the dynamic security index, attack
detectability, and observability under sensor attacks. It will
soon be revealed that an observability matrix behaves in the
same way as a coding matrix as examined in the previous
section, and hence its properties determine resilience of control
systems under sensor attacks.
A. Redundant Observability
From a control theoretical viewpoint, the notion of redun-
dant observability for the system (1) is defined as follows.
Definition 3. The pair (A,C) or the dynamical system (1)
is said to be q-redundant observable if the pair (A,CpiΛ) is
observable for any Λ ⊂ [p] satisfying |Λ| ≥ p− q.
To characterize the redundant observability in the following
proposition, we first obtain the observability matrix G ∈
Rnp×n as follows:
G :=
[
G>1 G
>
2 · · · G>p
]>
, (10)
where Gi :=
[
c>i (ciA)
> · · · (ciAn−1)>
]>
is an observability
matrix of the pair (A, ci).
Proposition 3. The following are equivalent:
(i) the pair (A,C) is q-redundant observable;
(ii) the matrix G is (n-stacked) q-error detectable.
Proof. From the fact that GpiΛn is the observability matrix of
the pair (A,CpiΛ), the pair (A,C) is q-redundant observable
if and only if GpiΛn has full column rank for any Λ ⊂ [p]
satisfying |Λ| ≥ p− q. Thus, the result directly follows from
Proposition 1.
B. Attack Detectability and Dynamic Security Index
Assume tentatively that there is no control input, distur-
bance, nor noise in the system (1) so that we can focus on the
attack signal only. Then, the output measurements for a finite
time period are collected and the stacked output sequence is
computed as
y¯[0:n−1] :=

y¯
[0:n−1]
1
y¯
[0:n−1]
2
...
y¯
[0:n−1]
p
 =

G1
G2
...
Gp
x(0) +

a
[0:n−1]
1
a
[0:n−1]
2
...
a
[0:n−1]
p

= Gx(0) + a[0:n−1],
(11)
where y¯[0:n−1]i := [y¯i(0) y¯i(1) · · · y¯i(n− 1)]> and a[0:n−1]i :=
[ai(0) ai(1) · · · ai(n−1)]>. Noting that the situation is exactly
the same as the noiseless case in Section II-A and a[0:n−1] is
(n-stacked) q-sparse by Assumption 2, we can introduce the
notion of q-attack detectability of the system (1) as follows.
Definition 4. The pair (A,C) or the dynamical system (1)
without disturbances/noises is said to be q-attack detectable if,
for all x(0), x′(0) ∈ Rn and a[0:n−1] ∈ Σnq such that Gx(0) +
a[0:n−1] = Gx′(0), it holds that x(0) = x′(0).
Furthermore, a direct comparison between Definitions 1 and
4 simply leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The following are equivalent:
(i) the pair (A,C) is q-attack detectable;
(ii) the matrix G is (n-stacked) q-error detectable.
As a tool for the vulnerability analysis of a system, the
security index quantifies fundamental limitations on the attack
detectability. That is, the dynamic security index of the system
(1), αd(A,C), is defined by the minimum number of sensor
attacks for adversaries to remain undetectable and is computed
by examining the system’s strong observability in [8] as
αd(A,C) = min
v∈V(A)
‖Cv‖0. (12)
It is shown in the following proposition that the dynamic secu-
rity index can also be characterized by the error detectability
of the observability matrix G through its cospark.
Proposition 5. For αd(A,C) given in (12), it holds that
αd(A,C) = min
x∈Rn, x 6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n = cosparkn(G). (13)
Proof. When Av = λv, one can trivially check that
min
v∈V(A)
‖Cv‖0 = min
v∈V(A)
‖Gv‖0n
since Giv =
[
civ λciv · · · λn−1civ
]>
. Noting that
min
x∈Cn, x6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n = min
x∈Rn, x6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n
because G ∈ Rnp×n is a real matrix, it suffices to show that
min
v∈V(A)
‖Gv‖0n = min
x∈Cn, x6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n .
Now, we claim that there exists v∗ ∈ V(A) such that
‖Gv∗‖0n = min
x∈Cn, x6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n .
Let us denote the optimal value of the problem (13) by
α∗ := min
x∈Rn, x6=0n×1
‖Gx‖0n .
By the equivalence between Proposition 1.(ii) and (iii) with
the observability matrix G, there exists an index set Λ ⊂ [p]
satisfying |Λ| = p−α∗ such that the observability matrix GpiΛn
does not have full column rank but the observability matrix
Gpi(Λ∪{i})n has full column rank for every i ∈ Λc. That is,
the pair (A,CpiΛ) is not observable but the pair (A,C
pi
Λ∪{i}) is
observable for every i ∈ Λc. Applying the Popov–Belevitch–
Hautus (PBH) observability test, we conclude that there exist
λ∗ ∈ C and v∗ ∈ V(A) such that[
λ∗In×n −A
CpiΛ
]
v∗ =
[
0n×1
0(p−α∗)×1
]
and civ
∗ 6= 0, ∀i ∈ Λc.
The claim easily follows by verifying that ‖Gv∗‖0n = α∗.
C. Observability under Sparse Sensor Attacks
In this section, the notion of observability under q-sparse
sensor attacks is introduced and an equivalent condition is
directly derived from the definition, as follows.
7Definition 5. The pair (A,C) or the dynamical system (1)
without disturbances/noises is said to be observable under q-
sparse sensor attacks if the initial state x(0) can be determined
from the output y¯ over a finite number of sampling steps with
any sensor attack a satisfying Assumption 2.
Proposition 6. The following are equivalent:
(i) the pair (A,C) is observable under q-sparse sensor at-
tacks;
(ii) the matrix G is (n-stacked) q-error correctable.
Proof. Note that the output sequence y¯[0:n−1] is given by
y¯[0:n−1] = Gx(0) + a[0:n−1] ∈ Rnp in (11) and a[0:n−1] ∈ Σnq
by Assumption 2, the result directly follows from Definition 2
which says that G is (n-stacked) q-error correctable if and only
if x(0) can be reconstructed from the output measurements
y¯[0:n−1].
IV. DESIGN OF ATTACK-RESILIENT ESTIMATOR
An attack-resilient state estimator E , which combines the
partial observers Oi and the decoder D, is designed in this
section. First, the partial observersOi are designed by applying
the Kalman observability decomposition to each sensor output.
Second, the previously developed error correction technique
tailored into this specific problem constitutes the decoder D
and it recovers the original state variable x.
A. Design of Partial Observers
With only one measurement y¯i(k) of the plant (1), a single-
output system is obtained as follows:
Pi :
{
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + d(k)
y¯i(k) = cix(k) + ni(k) + ai(k).
(14)
The observability matrix Gi of (14) is used to divide the
n-dimensional state space into two subspaces. To derive a
transformation matrix, first, let νi be the observability index
of (A, ci), i.e., νi := rank(Gi). Then the set of the first νi rows
of Gi is linearly independent. The null space of Gi, N (Gi),
which is A-invariant, is the unobservable subspace. Further-
more, the quotient space Rn/N (Gi) is sometimes called, with
abuse of terminology, the observable subspace. The matrices
Zi ∈ Rn×νi and Wi ∈ Rn×(n−νi) are selected such that
their columns are orthonormal bases of N (Gi)⊥(= R(G>i ))
and N (Gi), respectively. Finally, by the Kalman observability
decomposition, the state x is decomposed into the observable
sub-state zi ∈ Rνi and the unobservable sub-state wi ∈ Rn−νi
with a similarity transformation[
z>i w
>
i
]>
=
[
Zi Wi
]>
x. (15)
Since it follows that Z>i AWi = Oνi×(n−νi) and ciWi =
01×(n−νi) from the construction of Zi and Wi, the change of
variable (15) leads the original single-output system (14) to
the decomposed form of
P ′i :

[
zi(k + 1)
wi(k + 1)
]
=
[
Z>i AZi Oνi×(n−νi)
W>i AZi W
>
i AWi
] [
zi(k)
wi(k)
]
+
[
Z>i B
W>i B
]
u(k) +
[
Z>i
W>i
]
d(k)
y¯i(k)=
[
ciZi 01×(n−νi)
] [zi(k)
wi(k)
]
+ ni(k) + ai(k).
(16)
By dropping the unobservable sub-state wi from (16), the
observable quotient sub-system of (16) is obtained as
Poi :
{
zi(k + 1) = Sizi(k) + Z
>
i Bu(k) + Z
>
i d(k)
y¯i(k) = tizi(k) + ni(k) + ai(k),
(17)
where Si := Z>i AZi, ti := ciZi, and the pair (Si, ti) is
observable.
Then, the partial observer Oi is designed by a Luenberger
observer for (17) given in the following form:
Oi : zˆi(k + 1) = Fizˆi(k) + Z>i Bu(k) + Liy¯i(k), (18)
where the injection gain Li is chosen so that Fi := Si − Liti
is Schur stable. The dynamics of state estimation error z˜i :=
zˆi − zi is governed by
Fi : z˜i(k+1) = Fiz˜i(k) + Lini(k)− Z>i d(k) + Liai(k)
whose solution becomes
z˜i(k) = vi(k) + ei(k), (19)
where vi(k) := F ki z˜i(0)+
∑k−1
j=0 F
k−1−j
i
(
Lini(j)− Z>i d(j)
)
and ei(k) :=
∑k−1
j=0 F
k−1−j
i Liai(j). Here, the attack-induced
estimation error vector ei(k) may have arbitrary values. For
all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ [p], there exist µF ≥ 1 and 0 < β < 1 such
that ‖F ki ‖2 ≤ µFβk since Fi is Schur stable. In addition,
for some µL and µZ , it holds that ‖F ki Li‖2 ≤ µLβk and
‖F ki Z>i ‖2 ≤ µZβk. Then, one can easily show that
‖vi(k)‖2 ≤ µF ‖z˜i(0)‖2βk + wmax ≤ vmax(k), (20)
where wmax := (µLnmax +µZdmax)/(1−β) and vmax(k) :=
max
i∈[p]
{
µF ‖z˜i(0)‖2βk + wmax
}
. As k increases, vmax(k) con-
verges to wmax.
B. Design of the Decoder
The decoder collects all the data zˆi from the partial observers
Oi and formulates the problem in the form of (2). To this end,
Z>i x = zi in (15), is used. Appending n−νi zero row vectors,
01×n, to each Z>i and stacking them all, we haveZ
n
1
>
...
Znp
>
x(k) =
z
n
1(k)
...
znp(k)
 =
zˆ
n
1(k)
...
zˆnp(k)
−
z˜
n
1(k)
...
z˜np(k)
 , (21)
where
Zni
> :=
[
Zi
>
O(n−νi)×n
]
, zni (k) :=
[
zi(k)
0(n−νi)×1
]
,
zˆni (k) :=
[
zˆi(k)
0(n−νi)×1
]
, z˜ni (k) :=
[
z˜i(k)
0(n−νi)×1
]
.
(22)
This augmentation of zeros is to match the size of each
matrix so that it agrees with the n-stacked vector considered
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in Section II. Now, (21) with (19) is written in a compact form
as
zˆ(k) = Φx(k) + z˜(k) = Φx(k) + v(k) + e(k) ∈ Rnp, (23)
where Φ :=
[
Zn1 Z
n
2 · · · Znp
]>
. It is supposed that additional
zero elements are also appended to vi(k) and ei(k) as in (22).
Since (23) exactly matches with (2), one can directly apply
the error correction technique developed in Section II into
(23). Theorems 3 and 4 are mainly employed so as to recover
x(k). Before applying them, one should check that three
conditions on those theorems are satisfied for the given system
(1): boundedness of v(k), q-sparsity of e(k), and q-error
correctability of Φ. The first two conditions are easily satisfied
by Assumptions 1 and 2. That is, the noise vector vi(k) is
bounded by vmax(k) for all i ∈ [p] by (20), which is induced
from Assumption 1. Since the error vector ei(k) depends
only on the attack element ai(j) for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and
a(j) is q-sparse according to Assumption 2, the vector e(k)
is (n-stacked) q-sparse. An additional assumption should be
declared for the last condition, the q-error correctability of Φ,
to be fulfilled.
Assumption 3. The pair (A,C) is 2q-redundant observable. ♦
Under Assumption 3, Propositions 2 and 3 ensure the q-
error correctability of G where G is given in (10). Thus, Φ
is also q-error correctable because R(Φ>Λn) = R(G>Λn) for
any Λ ⊂ [p] by the construction of Φ and its elements Zi>.
Therefore, all three conditions on Theorems 3 and 4 hold.
The decoder’s configuration is sketched in Fig. 2 and its
operation is described in Algorithm 1. During the operation
of the decoder, the monitoring scheme that the selector S and
the switch s perform is running on the basis of Theorem 4,
whereas the calculator C and the minimizerM have their roots
in Theorems 1 and 3, respectively. Note that x¯ of each selector
Si in Fig. 2 represents xˆ′ at the stage of monitoring (line
3 of Algorithm 1) and xˆ during the updating step (line 10
of Algorithm 1). If f ≤ q, the successful state estimation is
ensured by Theorem 4.(i). More specifically, we have ‖xˆ −
x‖2 ≤ κcp,q,r(Φ)vmax. In this case, the index set Λ can be
supposed to be attack-free, and hence the calculator C can
recover the original state x approximately by xˆ = (ΦΛn)
†
zˆΛn ,
which is attributed to Theorem 1. On the other hand, if f > q,
the state estimate xˆ is not close enough to the original state x
Algorithm 1 Operation of the decoder
Input: zˆ1, zˆ2, · · · , zˆp
Output: xˆ, f
Initialization: Λ = [p]
1: while System (1) is running do
2: xˆ′ = (ΦΛn)
†
zˆΛn
3: f = p− ∣∣{i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆi − Z>i xˆ′‖2 ≤ v′max}∣∣
4: if f ≤ q then
5: Switch s selects the line from C
6: Calculator C sets xˆ = xˆ′
7: else
8: Switch s selects the line from M
9: Minimizer M solves (5′) and produces xˆ = xˆopt
10: Update Λ =
{
i ∈ [p] : ‖zˆi − Z>i xˆ‖2 ≤ v′max
}
11: end if
12: end while
by Theorem 4.(ii). Hence, the algorithm goes to the minimizer
step (i.e., the switch s chooses the side of the minimizer M)
to figure out new healthy sensors and the state estimates xˆ
by xˆopt. Furthermore, Theorem 3 guarantees that ‖xˆ− x‖2 ≤
κcp,q,r(Φ)vmax. These results are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the estimator E
equipped with the observers Oi given by (18) and the decoder
D employing Algorithm 1, guarantees that
‖xˆ(k)− x(k)‖2 ≤ κcp,q,r(Φ) vmax(k), ∀k ≥ 0,
where limk→∞ vmax(k) = wmax.
Remark 3. For the resilient state estimation, most of the
computational burden originates from the process of solving
the optimization problem. The proposed decoder reduces the
computational effort by combining the attack detection mecha-
nism with the optimization process. Algorithm 1 only requires
the minimization problem to be solved for a very short time
interval when the attacker first attempts to inject false data so
that the decoder has f > q at that instant. On the other hand,
the estimator works as if there is no attack and computes only
one simple pseudoinverse of a matrix during normal operation
when f ≤ q is guaranteed. ♦
Remark 4. Other observer-based resilient state estimators
such as those in [4] and [14], consist of all possible com-
binations of estimator candidates. Thus, they need to run
(
p
q
)
estimators so that the required memory size is n
(
p
q
)
. On the
other hand, the total memory size of all partial observers in
the proposed estimator,
∑p
i=1 νi, is not greater than np because
the size of each partial observer Oi is νi ≤ n for all i ∈ [p]. ♦
V. SIMULATION RESULTS: THREE INERTIA SYSTEM
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, simula-
tions with a three inertia system are conducted in this section.
The configuration of the three inertia system is described in
9(a) System model
-
(b) Control block diagram
Fig. 3: Three inertia system and its control scheme.
Fig. 3(a) and its dynamics can be represented by a continuous-
time state-space equation
Pc :
{
x˙(t) = Acx(t) +Bcu(t) + d(t)
y(t) = Ccx(t) + n(t) + a(t)
(24)
with the matrices
Ac =

0 1 0 0 0 0
− k1J1 − b1J1 k1J1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
k1
J2
0 −k1+k2J2 − b2J2 k2J2 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 k2J3 0 − k2J3 − b3J3
 ,
Bc =

0
1
J1
0
0
0
0
 , Cc =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0
 ,
where J1 = J2 = J3 = 0.01 kg·m2, b1 = b2 = b3 = 0.007
N·m/(rad/s), and k1 = k2 = 1.37 N·m/rad. Here, the
state variables are x := [θ1 θ˙1 θ2 θ˙2 θ3 θ˙3]> and the
output measurements are y := [θ1 θ2 θ3 θ1−θ2 θ2−θ3]>.
In addition, the plant is corrupted by the uniformly bounded
process disturbance d and measurement noise n with dmax =
nmax = 0.001. To conduct a discrete-time simulation, the
zero-order hold equivalent model of (24) is considered, that
is, the matrices of the discrete-time system (1) are given
by A := eAcTs , B :=
( ∫ Ts
0
eAcτdτ
)
Bc, and C := Cc
where Ts := 1 ms denotes the sampling time. Note that
the pair (A,C) is 2-redundant observable, which implies that
one can correct the 1-sparse attack signal and its dynamic
security index becomes 3. The control objective is to make
the output θ3 follow the step reference θ3,ref . To this end, an
observer-based feedback integral control scheme is adopted,
as illustrated in [20, Section 6.7] and also in Fig. 3(b). First,
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Fig. 4: Plot of signals.
the state feedback gains K and KI are chosen as
K := −[2.32 0.25 −2.47 0.04 1.70 0.12], KI := 0.002,
as if the state x is available. Then, instead of using the
conventional Luenberger observer, the proposed estimator E
provides the estimate xˆ of x. The injection gains Li of the
partial observer (18) in E are chosen arbitrarily such that
Fi = Si−Liti is Schur stable. Attack signals are illustrated in
Fig. 4(a), which describes that adversaries launch a measure-
ment data injection attack at t = 2 s so that the first sensor
is compromised. Figures 4(b) and 4(c) show state trajectories
θ1(t), θ˙2(t), and their estimates. It demonstrates the attack-
resilient property of our estimation algorithm. Finally, Fig. 4(d)
shows the reference tracking performance of the proposed
control scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
An LTI system is said to be 2q-redundant observable if it is
observable even after eliminating any 2q measurements. Rela-
tionships between the redundant observability and the security
problems on cyber-physical systems under sensor attacks have
been examined. To summarize, 2q-redundant observability
implies that the numbers of detectable and correctable sensor
attacks are 2q and q, respectively. In addition, the dynamic
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security index, the minimum number of attacks to remain
undetectable, is 2q + 1.
Assuming that the measurement data injection attack is q-
sparse and the disturbances/noises are bounded, an attack-
resilient and robust state estimation scheme has been proposed
under 2q-redundant observability. The proposed estimator con-
sists of a bank of partial observers operating based on the
Kalman observability decomposition and a decoder exploiting
error correction techniques. In terms of time complexity, the
decoder reduces the required computational effort by reducing
the search space to a finite set and by combining a detection
algorithm with the optimization process. On the other hand,
in terms of space complexity, the required memory is linear
with the number of sensors by means of the decomposition
used for constructing a bank of partial observers.
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